Yes, of course, because when I said ‘most people’ I clearly meant everyone.

And if you, and most of the people you know, are in positions of power and not shitty people, then you’re either a pleasant person with nice friends, or lying. Either way, good for you.

Because only western people are shitty? Or only the western ‘elites’? Does being ‘elite’ from a non western country automatically absolve somebody from this?

I think I’m also going to need to get you to define ‘western’ and ‘elite’ here too.

No, I’m just as human as the rest of you. I just don’t believe people are capable of communism. Communism always ends with corrupt, power hungry dictators.

People are not capable of being better, if we were we would have done so by now. Humans have been around for 100,000 years or so, in various forms, so why in all our the known history, have we not been better yet? And why is it at all logical to assume we suddenly could be, despite this?

That’s the only Buddhist thing burgers know. Was it on the idiotbox or something?

gotcha, that’s kinda dialectical even. And useful. I won’t ever get the western abhorrence at getting instructed by someone or at showing minor imperfections.

Bakhunin was a marxist too, one of the best.

no u

Communism is when the government does stuff

The more stuff the more communist

Obvious troll is obvious.

You… Don’t think nuclear war will bring pinko aliens down to rescue us?

govt magically dissolves

You seem to have a serious misunderstanding of what communists are actually advocating for. Communists don’t advocate for the dissolution of the government but the dissolution of the state, which are 2 distinct things. The government serves a vital purpose of administration and organisation. The state is the arm of the government that enforces one classes rule over the others. If there is only one class (the proletariat) the state dissolves not out of some virtue but because it simply stops serving a purpose.

Yes all Chinese communists are delusional capitalists who get their understanding of theory from YouTube and social media hugboxes. You are very smart.

I felt it could be helpful for others if I provided a more in depth response.

China certainly has political limits, but criticism and complaints are not remotely absent from the system. Local Party and government offices, petitioning channels, public consultations, and the 12345 hotline exist entirely to receive complaints about officials, services, and governance. That is very different from the fantasy that ordinary criticism automatically destroys your career.

China does have surveillance (as every modern state does), but the idea that every citizen’s movement and every computer action are constantly recorded and AI-scanned for dissent are complete fantasy. Xinjiang did experience much heavier security measures, but that policy arose after a real period of (US backed) terrorism and jihadist recruitment. On that note, compared with the Western response to terrorism, which involved invading, bombing, occupying, and destabilizing Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere, China’s emphasis on domestic security, education, policing and deradicalization was hardly monstrous.

Foreign visitors are also not required to repeatedly report to police stations. Their accommodation has to be registered, generally once at each place they stay, and hotels normally do it automatically. Nor is coordination between national and local police somehow inherently sinister. A coherent national legal system is preferable to fragmented local authorities acting as semi-independent fiefdoms.

The economic comparison is plainly ridiculous as it completely ignores class character. Both China and the US contain markets, corporations and state intervention because those are forms that can exist under very different systems. The real questions are who controls finance and strategic industry, whether private capital commands the state or is subordinate to it, where investment is directed, and what the system actually produces.

China directs credit and investment through planning, retains public control over strategic industries, and regularly disciplines private capital when it conflicts with public priorities. Billionaires exist because private property exists, but they do not exercise anything like the structural political power American billionaires do. In the US, capital openly dominates through ownership, lobbying, campaign finance, media power and the revolving door between business and government.

The military comparison is especially unserious because it compares America’s documented history with speculation about what China might someday do. The US has actually invaded, bombed, occupied, sanctioned and destabilized countries across the world. The China side of the argument is basically that China has a large navy, might fight over Taiwan, and therefore perhaps one day its admirals will invent overseas wars. One side is historical fact while the other is fan fiction.

It also ignores why China has expanded its military. China is surrounded by an American military architecture running through Japan, South Korea, Guam, the Philippines and the wider first island chain, while the United States spends vastly more on its military and maintains hundreds of overseas bases. Chinese military modernization does not occur in a vacuum.

Calling Chinese elections “performative and meaningless” is something only someone who knows nothing could say. That description does however fit the United States, where elections are enormous media spectacles financed by billionaires, corporations, PACs and lobbying networks, while vast amounts of real political and economic power remain in the hands of unelected owners of capital. Chinese elections are deliberately far less theatrical. Candidates are not expected to raise fortunes, buy national advertising campaigns or turn politics into celebrity competition. Deputies at the county and township levels are directly elected, with higher people’s congresses elected through the congress system, and these bodies form part of the actual machinery of state power.

China is also not literally a one-party state in the sense implied here. The CPC holds the leading role, but eight other recognized political parties participate through the united front and consultative system. They are not opposition parties competing to remove the CPC, but comparing that structure to the Republican Party controlling the United States is absurd.

The personality-cult comparison is similarly shallow. Xi has unquestionably overseen greater political centralization and has a much more prominent ideological role than some recent Chinese leaders. But Mao-era mass politics, Xi’s position within a Leninist party-state, and Trump’s highly personalized electoral movement are very different phenomena. Calling all three a personality cult obscures more than it explains.

Chinese unions are not nonexistent. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions has hundreds of millions of members and operates throughout Chinese workplaces. There are valid criticisms about bureaucratism, insufficient worker initiative, and how effectively particular unions confront management, but that is very different from saying labor organization has been abolished or reduced to nothing.

The birth-rate claim is almost entirely speculation. China’s present policy is based overwhelmingly on subsidies, childcare support, tax relief and reducing the cost of raising children. The One Child Policy can and should be criticized for coercive implementation in earlier decades (even still said criticism must be situated in the context of the material reality of the time famine, underdevelopment etc.), but saying that because China once restricted fertility it will probably someday force women to have children is not evidence but once again more fan fiction.

The same applies to AI. China and the US invest heavily in artificial intelligence because it matters for industry, science, logistics, medicine, military capability and productivity. Claiming that both leaderships are secretly building AI in order to establish permanent political control is simply mind-reading unless evidence is provided.

The idea that the Chinese corporate and political leadership classes are basically identical is also false. Party membership among businesspeople does not mean that private companies somehow own the Party. The relevant issue is political supremacy. In the US, wealthy capitalists possess enormous independent power through ownership of production, finance, media and political funding. In China, private capital exists inside a system where strategic assets remain publicly controlled and where the state can regulate, discipline and redirect capital according to national priorities.

That is the central error throughout the whole argument. It sees police, cameras, corporations, markets, political parties, warships, leaders and AI in both countries and concludes that the systems must be converging. By that method almost every modern industrial state is the same.

A serious comparison has to examine property relations, class power, ownership, planning, political institutions, historical development, foreign policy and actual social outcomes. This argument largely avoids all of that.

Economic system consisting of market economies with heavy state intervention in key national industries. (Both are taking outright ownership stakes in companies in certain key sectors.)

What? Exactly which industries is the US in the business of nationalizing??

See my explanation in the sister comment to yours.