• neatchee@piefed.social
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    1 hour ago

    This has big “don’t use a standard deadbolt on your front door; it’s not as strong as reinforced titanium doors with time-release locks” energy

    Like, not technically wrong, but does not fit the standard risk profile, it’s overkill for boost situations.

    Also to everyone talking about US law enforcement, this is just so easy to protect from, not worth ditching biometrics: if you see cops approaching and are worried about a device being unlocked, just reboot it. If you need to do it surreptitiously, just hold the power button to force shut it off after ~10s. This will always require a password to unlock after

  • nixukty@lemmy.zip
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    4 hours ago

    Do you really not use your phones fingerprint reader and type in your passcode every time?

    I get that you can be compelled by law enforcement to give up your biometrics, but if you’re gonna end up in that sort of situation it’s 2 buttons and a tap to temporarily disable biometrics.

  • m-p{3}@lemmy.ca
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    16 hours ago

    As soon as the word “convenient” is used, you know it will affect security.

    • hades@feddit.uk
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      16 hours ago

      Yep, they technically didn’t claim it was to make it more secure.

      • ricecake@sh.itjust.works
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        16 hours ago

        Why do you think that? Public key authentication systems are invariably more secure, and a wide variety are also simpler for the end user to use.

        It’s a misconception that they are in opposition to each other. Why would they be? One’s about knowing who’s doing something and the other is about how much effort it takes to do it.

        • psycotica0@lemmy.ca
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          5 hours ago

          Public key authentication is more secure than nothing, and is more convenient than shared secrets and symmetric encryption, but bit for bit the secret material necessary for public key cryptographic schemes to be secure is more data than is required for symmetric algorithms.

          But more to your point, public key cryptography is basically a usability nightmare. In order to talk to anyone you need to first validate their key using an entirely out of band scheme you already trust, and if you don’t do that then all the end to end encryption in the world is theatre.

          Of course I’m being hyperbolic, it’s the internet, but seriously there a lot of people feeling secure with public key systems that are either totally insecure, or could be insecure and they wouldn’t know, or are secure to some random bystander but insecure to people and organizations that are often included in people’s threat models.

        • davidgro@lemmy.world
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          12 hours ago

          Because in general, making things more difficult for an adverse party has great potential for also having side effects for proper users. And conversely, making things easier for proper users very often also makes it easier for adversaries.

          You’re right that it’s not a strict 100% rule, but it’s so common a pattern that keeping it in mind when making security decisions (to avoid fulfilling it or at least weigh risks) is a good practice.

  • JRaccoon@discuss.tchncs.de
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    16 hours ago

    I think it depends. Some people might be inclined to use too short or simple password because they don’t wanna constantly be typing a long password. It’s much better to have a strong password and fingerprint/face rec for convince than just a insecure password.

    • AmyAye@nord.pub
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      9 hours ago

      Cops can’t force you to give up your password even if its 12345.

    • GamingChairModel@lemmy.world
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      14 hours ago

      The other underappreciated threat model is shoulder surfing, especially in an age of ubiquitous high resolution cameras. Punching in a numerical PIN within view of a camera potentially leaks that secret, and some high resolution cameras can even pick up letters and symbols from the on screen keyboards.

      Being compelled to give biometrics doesn’t do enough for an adversary (including government adversaries) to do everything with a phone, the way having the password or PIN does, and I would argue that governments would be better at tricking people into inadvertently giving up their PINs and passwords than they’d be at compelling biometrics within the time window that they still work (before the phones lockout biometrics as a valid unlocking method), or being able to do stuff to exploit extraction tools past the lock screen.

      So the threat model needs to be understood for what it is.

      • imadethis@fedinsfw.app
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        7 hours ago

        Hell, I still sometimes think about the research team that tried to make a camera in a bus (so at the front pointed towards the faces of riders) obtain passwords from the reflections off of sunglasses. They collectively facepalmed when they tried it with their test subject, but accidentally picked up the passwords of several others on the bus that were not part of the experiment.

        That was something like 8-12 years ago… Capabilities now are likely insane.

    • CubitOom@infosec.pubOP
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      15 hours ago

      In the USA, they can legally force you to unlock a device using biometrics.

      Also, biometrics can be fooled in other ways.

      • boonhet@sopuli.xyz
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        5 hours ago

        Ah just don’t go to the USA or don’t take a device with information on it there.

      • GamingChairModel@lemmy.world
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        11 hours ago

        Law enforcement can legally trick you into giving up your password, too, and that’s full access right there. Having an unlocked phone but no password isn’t enough to get into certain parts of the core system/security settings, and trying to get into those will prompt a password anyway (and that generally gatekeeps the access to the phone through a physical connector plugged into the port).

        Neither pathway is perfect but I think for real world usage and real world adversaries (not just law enforcement, but also criminal thieves/scammers/hackers, and governmental adversaries that aren’t bound by legal limits, like foreign intelligence agencies), it’s better to have biometrics so that you are physically punching in your PIN/password much less frequently. Especially on modern systems that get spooked easily and require a password anyway when the phone has been idle too long or when the wrong face looks at it too many times.

      • JRaccoon@discuss.tchncs.de
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        15 hours ago

        Yes, but that’s besides the point. If the convenient options for a normie user are

        • Having a weak password
        • Having a strong password and a fingerprint

        Out of those the fingerprint with a strong password is way better option, imo.

        In the USA, they can legally force you to unlock a device using biometrics.

        Also, how does that work? Can’t they legally force you to enter your password too? Or can you claim you don’t remember it? If that works, can’t you just have a band-aid on your finger or something? Surely they cannot force you to take it off and risk getting an infection on the large wound you just happened to get yesterday…?

        • queermunist she/her@lemmy.ml
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          15 hours ago

          Also, how does that work? Can’t they legally force you to enter your password too?

          No, because forcing someone to enter a password is “compelled speech” and against the 1st Amendment. It’s also testimonial, which means compelling that speech would also be self incrimination, which is against the 5th Amendment.

          Don’t ask me why forcing someone to make a hand gesture is not also compelled speech and not testimonial. The Constitution is mostly nonsense being interpreted by life appointed morons who interpret things however they like.

          • Viceversa@lemmy.world
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            13 hours ago

            Constitution is mostly nonsense being interpreted by life appointed morons who interpret things however they like.

            Bible / Quran, is that you?

        • curbstickle@anarchist.nexus
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          12 hours ago

          ‘Or’ not ‘and’. Fingerprint replaces the password for access.

          A bandaid would simply be removed. No you can’t just say “no”. A password is protected though.

        • 0x0@infosec.pub
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          15 hours ago

          A normal user will most likely never encounter a situation where their weak password would be at risk, but are much more likely to having their biometrics forced by law enforcement or border control.

          They will rip your bandaid off and force your finger or face to scan while holding your device.

          Any weak password at all would have been better in a situation like that.

          • JRaccoon@discuss.tchncs.de
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            15 hours ago

            Oh wow, things really have gotten bad over there. For me personally, the much greater risk is that I forget my phone somewhere or someone steals it and in that scenario a weak password is the larger issue.

            It seems there isn’t a single correct answer here. The threat model is different for everyone.

            • CubitOom@infosec.pubOP
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              13 hours ago

              I think the correct answer is that your device shouldn’t suggest you to have a weak password work around, it should suggest a stronger password

  • ricecake@sh.itjust.works
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    16 hours ago

    Why?

    It’s not like they’re literally using your face or fingerprint as a password. They’re not even storing them, just a hash tied to an hsm key.

    • fyf@lemmy.world
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      15 hours ago

      I can’t speak for OP, but in the US, you can be compelled to unlock a phone via fingerprint or face ID. You can’t be compelled to give over your PIN. That violates the right against self incriminating.

      • ricecake@sh.itjust.works
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        15 hours ago

        Totally true. That’s not the common threat most people need to guard against however. Additionally, at least on Android, the device is relatively eager to force pin usage if the stars don’t align for biometrics

        • 0x0@infosec.pub
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          15 hours ago

          Almost any user are much more likely to encounter a situation where their biometrics are forced and not their password. Passing a border for example.

          Biometrics should never be used instead of a password, only as usernames. A password can be changed, your thumbs can’t.

          • ricecake@sh.itjust.works
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            12 hours ago

            Have you ever had your phone searched by the police or at the border? I haven’t, but I have had someone try to unlock my phone before.

            I’d contend most people have a threat model that puts opportunistic access by household members or someone watching them enter their passcode and then snatching the phone and running above border patrol search.

            While you can’t change your biometrics, walk me through why that matters. I’m not sharing my biometrics outside of the device, and you can’t submit them remotely, so if you lift a print off of something it doesn’t really get you much without also taking the phone. Once you’re there, you’re a bit beyond the typical phone thief in terms of threat.

            The most common vulnerability is having an absurdly weak password, pin or unlock pattern. For those people biometrics is a vast improvement specifically because it’s both secure against likely threats, and it’s just as easy as hitting 5 four times in a row.

            Every method has trade offs, and there’s nothing to gain by pretending otherwise. Likewise, I don’t think I would ever say “never use something”, except for some contrived examples.

          • Viceversa@lemmy.world
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            12 hours ago

            Almost any user are much more likely to encounter a situation where their biometrics are forced and not their password. Passing a border for example.

            That’s valid only for americans. And even then: how many of them are crossing country borders regularly?

      • deliriousdreams@fedia.io
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        11 hours ago

        Which means it’s not secure against the authorities but probably is secure against the average thief and or snooping younger sibling/spouse. So, your threat profile and the use of biometrics/vs password may vary.

        • fyf@lemmy.world
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          11 hours ago

          Definitely not. The average thief can get you to unlock it with your face or finger far easier than get your PIN.

          • ricecake@sh.itjust.works
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            6 hours ago

            If you point a weapon at me in a way that would compel me to help you unlock my phone with fingerprint or face unlock, I promise you it would not be any harder for you to get me to unlock the device with the pin.

          • deliriousdreams@fedia.io
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            11 hours ago

            Doubtful. The average thief isn’t robbing you at gunpoint. They grab the phone out of your hand and book it.

            But even if they did stick around for that, most people use a 4 number pin and that’s basically just as easy as face or fingerprint unlock. Its an additional maybe 2 seconds.

            If they can force you to put your finger on the sensor they can force you to give them the pin.

      • Viceversa@lemmy.world
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        12 hours ago

        You can’t be compelled to give over your PIN. That violates the right against self incriminating.

        Is that valid only to USA citizens or foreigners can use that trick too?

        • deliriousdreams@fedia.io
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          11 hours ago

          It’s valid for anyone visiting the US. Even if they do so illegally. Its a right given by the constitution and it’s amendments and those apply to everyone in the US. Importantly, people often forget that the Constitution isn’t a limiting document for the people. It’s a limiting document for the government.

    • No1@aussie.zone
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      13 hours ago

      When I rob you, I hold the phone up to your face to unlock it, then I cut off your finger to use it on your banking and crypto apps to transfer all your money.

      /s

  • unknownuserunknownlocation@kbin.earth
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    15 hours ago

    Hot take: biometrics are often criticized for being less secure, but that ignores the deficiencies of passwords. Especially on phones, it’s very doable to look over someone’s shoulder while they’re unlocking their phone or do the same with a camera. You can’t do that with a fingerprint, at least not nearly as easily.

    And yes, I understand that in the US (amongst others?) the legal situations with passwords and biometrics are different, but IMO that’s more of a legal question, and not everyone lives in the US.

    Android also has an “emergency lockdown” option, which disables biometrics for unlocking your phone - or you can shut it down (worst case scenario force shut down with a long hold on the power button) to get it into a BFU state, which is much harder to crack.