Let’s Encrypt will be reducing the validity period of the certificates we issue. We currently issue certificates valid for 90 days, which will be cut in half to 45 days by 2028.
This change is being made along with the rest of the industry, as required by the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements, which set the technical requirements that we must follow. All publicly-trusted Certificate Authorities like Let’s Encrypt will be making similar changes. Reducing how long certificates are valid for helps improve the security of the internet, by limiting the scope of compromise, and making certificate revocation technologies more efficient.

  • Arghblarg@lemmy.ca
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    15 hours ago

    So what’s the floor here realistically, are they going to lower it to 30 days, then 14, then 2, then 1? Will we need to log in every morning and expect to refresh every damn site cert we connect to soon?

    It is ignoring the elephant in the room – the central root CA system. What if that is ever compromised?

    Certificate pinning was a good idea IMO, giving end-users control over trust without these top-down mandated cert update schedules. Don’t get me wrong, LetsEncrypt has done and is doing a great service within the current infrastructure we have, but …

    I kind of wish we could just partition the entire internet into the current “commercial public internet” and a new (old, redux) “hobbyist private internet” where we didn’t have to assume every single god-damned connection was a hostile entity. I miss the comraderie, the shared vibe, the trust. Yeah I’m old.

    • Yggstyle@lemmy.world
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      40 minutes ago

      Is this the same trust that would infect a box in under a minute if not behind a router?

      The same trust of needing to scan anything you downloaded for script kiddie grade backdoors?

      Zero click ActiveX / js exploits?

      Man I’m probably the same age and those are some intense rose colored glasses 😅

      • Arghblarg@lemmy.ca
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        4 minutes ago

        Oh, definitely rose-coloured, but I am thinking even before those days… like when access to Usenet was restricted to colleges and universities, dial-up BBSes … and I didn’t use Windows or MacOS at all back then. ActiveX and js didn’t even exist back then. Boot-sector floppy viruses did, but those were easy to guard against.

    • teawrecks@sopuli.xyz
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      4 hours ago

      where we didn’t have to assume every single god-damned connection was a hostile entity

      But you always did, it was always being abused, regularly. That’s WHY we now use secure connections.

      I think I’m just not picking up whether you’re actually trying to pitch a technical solution, or just wishing for a perfect world without crime.

      • Arghblarg@lemmy.ca
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        2 minutes ago

        More the latter :) … if only we could all just get along and be nicer to each other. Sigh.

    • ByteJunk@lemmy.world
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      9 hours ago

      Partition the internet… Like during the Morris worm of '88, where they had to pull off regional networks to prevent the machines from being reinfected?

      The good old days were, maybe, not that good. :)

      • Appoxo@lemmy.dbzer0.com
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        5 hours ago

        Imagine trying to do this (excluding China, Russia and some middle eastern or african countries) in the western world.
        I would assume total anarchy (especially in the stock trade lol)

    • atzanteol@sh.itjust.works
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      15 hours ago

      Will we need to log in every morning and expect to refresh every damn site cert we connect to soon?

      Automate your certificate renewals. You should be automating updates for security anyway.

      • billwashere@lemmy.world
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        9 hours ago

        But can you imagine the load on their servers should it come to this? And god forbid it goes down for a few hours and every person in the world is facing SSL errors because Let’s Encrypt can’t create new ones.

        This continued shortening of lifespans on these certs is untenable at best. Personally I have never run into a situation where a cert was stolen or compromised but obviously that doesn’t mean it doesn’t happen. I also feel like this is meant to automate all cert production which is nice if you can. Right now, at my job, all cert creation requires manually generating a CSR, submit it to a website, wait for manager approval, and then wait for creation. Then go download the cert and install it manually.

        If I have to do this everyday for all my certs I’m not going to be happy. Yes this should be automated and central IT is supposed to be working on it but I’m not holding my breath.

        • Yggstyle@lemmy.world
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          37 minutes ago

          I doubt they will drop below 1-2 weeks. Any service outage would turn into a ddos when service was restored.

        • redjard@lemmy.dbzer0.com
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          2 hours ago

          The entire renewal process is fairly cheap, resource wise. 7 day certificates are already a thing.
          In terms of bandwidth you could easily renew a billion certificates a day over a gigabit connection, and in terms of performance I recon even without specialized hardware a single system could keep up with that, though that also depends on the signature algorithms employed in the future of course.

          The dependence on these servers is the far bigger problem I’d say.
          This shortening of lifetimes is a slow change, so I hope there will be solutions before it becomes an issue. Like keeping multiple copies of certificates alive with different providers, so the one in use can silently fall through when one provider stops working. Currently there are too few providers for my taste, that would have to improve for such a system to be viable.

          Maybe one day you’ll select a bundle of 5 certificate services with similar policies for creating your certificate the way you currently select a single one in certbot or acme.sh

      • dan@upvote.au
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        14 hours ago

        This is one of the reasons they’re reducing the validity - to try and convince people to automate the renewal process.

        That and there’s issues with the current revocation process (for incorrectly issued certificates, or certificates where the private key was leaked or stored insecurely), and the most effective way to reduce the risk is to reduce how long any one certificate can be valid for.

        A leaked key is far less useful if it’s only valid or 47 days from issuance, compared to three years. (note that the max duration was reduced from 3 years to 398 days earlier this year).

        From https://www.digicert.com/blog/tls-certificate-lifetimes-will-officially-reduce-to-47-days:

        In the ballot, Apple makes many arguments in favor of the moves, one of which is most worth calling out. They state that the CA/B Forum has been telling the world for years, by steadily shortening maximum lifetimes, that automation is essentially mandatory for effective certificate lifecycle management.

        The ballot argues that shorter lifetimes are necessary for many reasons, the most prominent being this: The information in certificates is becoming steadily less trustworthy over time, a problem that can only be mitigated by frequently revalidating the information.

        The ballot also argues that the revocation system using CRLs and OCSP is unreliable. Indeed, browsers often ignore these features. The ballot has a long section on the failings of the certificate revocation system. Shorter lifetimes mitigate the effects of using potentially revoked certificates. In 2023, CA/B Forum took this philosophy to another level by approving short-lived certificates, which expire within 7 days, and which do not require CRL or OCSP support.

    • Ooops@feddit.org
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      9 hours ago

      Will we need to log in every morning and expect to refresh every damn site cert we connect to soon?

      Certbot by default checks twice a day if it’s old enough to be be due for a renewal… So a change from 90 to 1 day will in practice make no difference already…

      • Arghblarg@lemmy.ca
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        58 seconds ago

        Good point. On that note I am very happy having moved my home server from Apache to Caddy. The auto cert config is very nice.

    • JASN_DE@feddit.org
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      15 hours ago

      So what’s the floor here realistically, are they going to lower it to 30 days, then 14, then 2, then 1?

      LE is beta-testing a 7-day validity, IIRC.

      Will we need to log in every morning and expect to refresh every damn site cert we connect to soon?

      No, those are expected or even required to be automated.

    • dan@upvote.au
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      14 hours ago

      The current plan is for the floor to be 47 days. https://www.digicert.com/blog/tls-certificate-lifetimes-will-officially-reduce-to-47-days, and this is not until 2029 in order to give people sufficient time to adjust. Of course, individual certificate authorities can choose to have lower validity periods than 47 days if they want to.

      Essentially, the goal is for everyone to automatically renew the certificates once per month, but include some buffer time in case of issues.

    • cron@feddit.org
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      14 hours ago

      The best approach for securing our CA system is the “certificate transparency log”. All issued certificates must be stored in separate, public location. Browsers do not accept certificates that are not there.

      This makes it impossible for malicious actors to silently create certificates. They would leave traces.

      • False@lemmy.world
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        11 hours ago

        Isn’t this just CRL in reverse? And CRL sucks or we wouldn’t be having this discussion. Part of the point of cryptographically signing a cert is so you don’t have to do this if you trust the issuer.

        Cryptography already makes it infeasible for a malicious actor to create a fake cert. The much more common attack vector is having a legitimate cert’s private key compromised.

        • cron@feddit.org
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          11 hours ago

          No, these are completely separate issues.

          • CRL: protect against certificates that have their private key compromised
          • CT: protect against incompetent or malicious Certificate Authorities.

          This is just one example why we have certificate transparency. Revocation wouldn’t be useful if it isn’t even known which certificates need revocation.

          The National Informatics Centre (NIC) of India, a subordinate CA of the Indian Controller of Certifying Authorities (India CCA), issues rogue certificates for Google and Yahoo domains. NIC claims that their issuance process was compromised and that only four certificates were misissued. However, Google is aware of misissued certificates not reported by NIC, so it can only be assumed that the scope of the breach is unknown.

          Source

        • Auli@lemmy.ca
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          11 hours ago

          Or the more likely a rouge certificate authority giving out certs it shouldn’t.

        • cron@feddit.org
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          14 hours ago

          The only disadvantage I see is that all my personal subdomains (e.g. immich.name.com and jellyfin) are forever stored in a public location. I wouldn’t call it a privacy nightmare, yet it isn’t optimal.

          There are two workarounds:

          • do not use public certificates
          • use wildcard certificates only
          • Burnoutdv@feddit.org
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            13 hours ago

            But how to automate wildcard certificate generation? That requires a change of the txt record and namecheap for instance got no mechanism for that to automatically happen on cert bot action

            • clif@lemmy.world
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              2 hours ago

              Doesn’t caddy support that (name cheap txt mod) via a plug-in?

              I haven’t tried it yet, but the plugin made it sound possible. I’m planning to automate on next expiration… When I get to it ;)

              I did already compile caddy with the plugin, just haven’t generated my name cheap token and tested.

              • clif@lemmy.world
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                2 hours ago

                Namecheap supports this according to docs. I just haven’t tested yet.

    • AlmightyDoorman@kbin.earth
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      14 hours ago

      Not exactly what you mean because there are also bad actors but take a look at i2p, in some ways it feels like an retro internet.

    • slazer2au@lemmy.world
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      15 hours ago

      Seeing as most root CA are stored offline compromising a server turned off is not really possible.

      I’m more annoyed that I have 10 year old gear that doesn’t have automation for this.

      • AA5B@lemmy.world
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        9 hours ago

        Signing (intermediate) certs have been compromised before. That means a bad actor can issue fake certs that are validated up to your root ca certs

        While you can invalidate that signing cert, without useful and ubiquitous revocation lists, there’s nothing you can do to propagate that.

        A compromised signing certs, effectively means invalidating the ca cert, to limit the damage

      • Arghblarg@lemmy.ca
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        14 hours ago

        Oh, I’m really just pining for the days before the ‘Eternal September’, I suppose. We can’t go back, I know. :/