It’s a good practice to NOT expose services to the internet unless it’s really needed. If they’re only for your use, then the entire world doesn’t need access. This isn’t specific to Jellyfin.
All software has the potential to have security issues.
thats, like, your opinion man. frankly slapping a VPN on top of everything else doesnt improve your security posture unless you have the skills to manage that system on top of everything, including ongoing validation that its configuration is restricting what you want it to.
a robust authn/authz at the application layer is what secures your environment. VPNs are just slapping a wall around your network that is trivially penetrated by the browsers (and their extensions) within your network.
stop spouting dogma seriously doesnt make you look intelligent. personally the only reason I bother with a VPN is so I can leverage my local networks dns to access services anywhere. its not for security.
If a service is publicly accessible, anyone can access it. Even if it’s secured, there can be security issues in the auth layer of the app, improperly secured endpoints, etc.
If a service is only available over VPN, nobody can access it unless they’re on the VPN. The service isn’t visible over the public internet and other people won’t even know it exists. You can require two factor auth to connect to the VPN.
I’m not sure why you seem to think that a private network isn’t more secure than a public network. There’s a reason why practically every company requires people working remotely to connect to a VPN to access company resources.
If a service is publicly accessible, anyone can access it.
false.
Even if it’s secured, there can be security issues in the auth layer of the app, improperly secured endpoints, etc.
true, fun fact a VPN is also an application with an auth layer. dun dun dun!
If a service is only available over VPN, nobody can access it unless they’re on the VPN.
which is basically anyone soon as a browser is in the mix. which it is.
I’m not sure why you seem to think that a private network isn’t more secure than a public network.
because I’ve done network hardening and know that they are only as secure as the devices and people that are a part of that network. it has nothing to do w/ private vs public and everything to do with what you do while within that network.
There’s a reason why practically every company requires people working remotely to connect to a VPN to access company resources.
uh huh. heard of lemmings? appeals to authority? etc, etc, etc. thats you right now. federal agencies guidelines regarding VPNs search terms for you: Federal Zero Trust Strategy (notably via OMB Memo M-22-09). Individuals like yourself are literally the reason they had to release these updated guidelines. because people kept quoting out of date security practices from their old guidelines as ‘good enough for the feds must be best practices’
like i said you dont know what you’re talking about. historical foot note: when the federal agency updated their recommendations regarding VPNs they were criticized by security experts for taking so fucking long to finally remove the misguided position that VPNs improve security that you hold.
here is a relevant snippet for everyone:
Regardless of the approach selected, agencies must move away from the practice of
maintaining a broad enterprise-wide network that allows enhanced visibility or access to many
distinct applications and enterprise functions. Accordingly, agencies should choose their zero
trust approach early enough to permit them to align that approach with their plans for IT
investment
Literally use ‘authn/authz’ and dont rely on VPNs for ACL. Here is another gem from that memo for today’s lucky 10,000:
Agencies must remove password policies that require
special characters and regular password rotation from
all systems
and yet companies still put that nonsense into their security policies.
I never said anything about using the VPN as an ACL. All I said was to only expose the service over the VPN. That doesn’t necessarily mean that the app doesn’t have authentication or authorization.
I’m also only talking about residential use cases, where it’s a common practice (when not using a VPN) to just expose everything via port forwarding. Businesses aren’t setting up Jellyfin on their servers.
true, fun fact a VPN is also an application with an auth layer. dun dun dun!
Sure, but someone would have to first get on the VPN, and then find vulnerable apps once on the internal network, as opposed to just scanning the internet for public-facing vulnerable systems. Wireguard (and thus Tailscale) doesn’t respond to port scans at all - it only responds to packets that are signed with a known key.
Admittedly, networking and network security isn’t my specialty so I’m absolutely sure you’ve got more knowledge in this area.
I never said anything about using the VPN as an ACL.
its literally your entire argument. you may not realize that is what you’re saying but it is. ‘vpns prevent {insert entity here} from accessing your systems by not publicly exposing them’. ACL -> ‘access control list’, you need to be on the VPNs list in order to access it which provides control for the network. your router already exposes you to the public internet. using a VPN or not doesnt change this.
in fact:
Sure, but someone would have to first get on the VPN
what do you think the phrase first geton the VPN means? its literally has access via the ACL. more on that paragraph later…
I’m also only talking about residential use cases, where it’s a common practice (when not using a VPN) to just expose everything via port forwarding.
business vs residential doesnt change security properties of approaches.
Businesses aren’t setting up Jellyfin on their servers.
because its literally is not a tool designed for any practical business use case. but that’s completely unrelated to its security properties. You’re literally just slapping a VPN in front to deal with the broken ACL’s that jellyfin provides.
Sure, but someone would have to first get on the VPN, and then find vulnerable apps once on the internal network, as opposed to just scanning the internet for public-facing vulnerable systems.
Doubling up on the authn/authz layers doesnt improve security, it just worsens user experience, which then leads to users taking short cuts for their own convenience undercutting whatever security you’re doing.
again as that wonderful federal document discusses VPNs are useful for preventing lateral movement once a device on a network is compromised (see worse user experience). but you literally need multiples of them in order for that to be effective and you need a reason for the segmentation.
Wireguard (and thus Tailscale) doesn’t respond to port scans at all - it only responds to packets that are signed with a known key.
port scanning isnt a vulnerability, its an attack optimization. a discovery mechanism once an attacker already on a network.
it doesnt really even slow attackers down these days. it doesnt take long to just plaster every port with your request for a specific application and when you’re attacking a system you essentially already know what vulnerabilities you’re going to attack (or you just try all the ones you have). oh no, it took them 30 seconds to compromise the network instead of 3…
you can also achieve similar properties at the application level w/ quic’s 0-RT, you send the auth request in the initial packet. so either the authn works or the connection silently hangs just like wireguard.
Nevermind the fact that using something like wireguard gives attackers something to target on your local device. ‘oh look, the keys to the kingdom just sitting here… on disk… in a well known directory… so kind of people to just leave these skeleton keys just lying out in the open like this, its a great trick VPNs have pulled teaching everyone they’re for security instead of privacy’
Admittedly, networking and network security isn’t my specialty
And I’ll refer you back to my original posts about VPNs not being effective security measures and how you should stop quoting dogma.
Its perfectly fine you’re using one, just stop spreading misinformation that they’re for security in any manner. you’re just using it to poorly plug security issues down stream in jellyfin.
fun fact: did you know that the encryption in the bittorrent protocol is basically useless and has major performance impacts when enabled?
also fun fact: did you know most networks get compromised by attacking the router itself first? you know the easiest thing to secure in the first place from a complexity standpoint? making this entire discuss pointless?
in real terms: try retrovibed at some point its still early days for it but its UX is designed around dealing with a lot of these issues.
except its not. VPNs provide no real protection for a network. its literally undercut by any network connection that reaches beyond the wall it provides.
VPNs are a routing simplification and privacy measure not a security measure. idiots try and use them as a security layer thinking they’re safer.
It’s a good practice to NOT expose services to the internet unless it’s really needed. If they’re only for your use, then the entire world doesn’t need access. This isn’t specific to Jellyfin.
All software has the potential to have security issues.
thats, like, your opinion man. frankly slapping a VPN on top of everything else doesnt improve your security posture unless you have the skills to manage that system on top of everything, including ongoing validation that its configuration is restricting what you want it to.
a robust authn/authz at the application layer is what secures your environment. VPNs are just slapping a wall around your network that is trivially penetrated by the browsers (and their extensions) within your network.
stop spouting dogma seriously doesnt make you look intelligent. personally the only reason I bother with a VPN is so I can leverage my local networks dns to access services anywhere. its not for security.
If a service is publicly accessible, anyone can access it. Even if it’s secured, there can be security issues in the auth layer of the app, improperly secured endpoints, etc.
If a service is only available over VPN, nobody can access it unless they’re on the VPN. The service isn’t visible over the public internet and other people won’t even know it exists. You can require two factor auth to connect to the VPN.
I’m not sure why you seem to think that a private network isn’t more secure than a public network. There’s a reason why practically every company requires people working remotely to connect to a VPN to access company resources.
false.
true, fun fact a VPN is also an application with an auth layer. dun dun dun!
which is basically anyone soon as a browser is in the mix. which it is.
because I’ve done network hardening and know that they are only as secure as the devices and people that are a part of that network. it has nothing to do w/ private vs public and everything to do with what you do while within that network.
uh huh. heard of lemmings? appeals to authority? etc, etc, etc. thats you right now. federal agencies guidelines regarding VPNs search terms for you: Federal Zero Trust Strategy (notably via OMB Memo M-22-09). Individuals like yourself are literally the reason they had to release these updated guidelines. because people kept quoting out of date security practices from their old guidelines as ‘good enough for the feds must be best practices’
like i said you dont know what you’re talking about. historical foot note: when the federal agency updated their recommendations regarding VPNs they were criticized by security experts for taking so fucking long to finally remove the misguided position that VPNs improve security that you hold.
here is a relevant snippet for everyone:
Literally use ‘authn/authz’ and dont rely on VPNs for ACL. Here is another gem from that memo for today’s lucky 10,000:
and yet companies still put that nonsense into their security policies.
I never said anything about using the VPN as an ACL. All I said was to only expose the service over the VPN. That doesn’t necessarily mean that the app doesn’t have authentication or authorization.
I’m also only talking about residential use cases, where it’s a common practice (when not using a VPN) to just expose everything via port forwarding. Businesses aren’t setting up Jellyfin on their servers.
Sure, but someone would have to first get on the VPN, and then find vulnerable apps once on the internal network, as opposed to just scanning the internet for public-facing vulnerable systems. Wireguard (and thus Tailscale) doesn’t respond to port scans at all - it only responds to packets that are signed with a known key.
Admittedly, networking and network security isn’t my specialty so I’m absolutely sure you’ve got more knowledge in this area.
its literally your entire argument. you may not realize that is what you’re saying but it is. ‘vpns prevent {insert entity here} from accessing your systems by not publicly exposing them’. ACL -> ‘access control list’, you need to be on the VPNs list in order to access it which provides control for the network. your router already exposes you to the public internet. using a VPN or not doesnt change this.
in fact:
what do you think the phrase
first get on the VPNmeans? its literallyhas access via the ACL. more on that paragraph later…business vs residential doesnt change security properties of approaches.
because its literally is not a tool designed for any practical business use case. but that’s completely unrelated to its security properties. You’re literally just slapping a VPN in front to deal with the broken ACL’s that jellyfin provides.
Doubling up on the authn/authz layers doesnt improve security, it just worsens user experience, which then leads to users taking short cuts for their own convenience undercutting whatever security you’re doing.
again as that wonderful federal document discusses VPNs are useful for preventing lateral movement once a device on a network is compromised (see worse user experience). but you literally need multiples of them in order for that to be effective and you need a reason for the segmentation.
port scanning isnt a vulnerability, its an attack optimization. a discovery mechanism once an attacker already on a network.
it doesnt really even slow attackers down these days. it doesnt take long to just plaster every port with your request for a specific application and when you’re attacking a system you essentially already know what vulnerabilities you’re going to attack (or you just try all the ones you have). oh no, it took them 30 seconds to compromise the network instead of 3…
you can also achieve similar properties at the application level w/ quic’s 0-RT, you send the auth request in the initial packet. so either the authn works or the connection silently hangs just like wireguard.
Nevermind the fact that using something like wireguard gives attackers something to target on your local device. ‘oh look, the keys to the kingdom just sitting here… on disk… in a well known directory… so kind of people to just leave these skeleton keys just lying out in the open like this, its a great trick VPNs have pulled teaching everyone they’re for security instead of privacy’
And I’ll refer you back to my original posts about VPNs not being effective security measures and how you should stop quoting dogma.
Its perfectly fine you’re using one, just stop spreading misinformation that they’re for security in any manner. you’re just using it to poorly plug security issues down stream in jellyfin.
fun fact: did you know that the encryption in the bittorrent protocol is basically useless and has major performance impacts when enabled?
also fun fact: did you know most networks get compromised by attacking the router itself first? you know the easiest thing to secure in the first place from a complexity standpoint? making this entire discuss pointless?
in real terms: try retrovibed at some point its still early days for it but its UX is designed around dealing with a lot of these issues.
The VPN isn’t “on top of” anything, it’s instead of everything.
except its not. VPNs provide no real protection for a network. its literally undercut by any network connection that reaches beyond the wall it provides.
VPNs are a routing simplification and privacy measure not a security measure. idiots try and use them as a security layer thinking they’re safer.