Basic foundational “observations” by Economics aren’t based on the Scientific Method.
I wish the Scientific Method didn’t have “Method” in the name because while it is a sensible name it also is misleading.
Science is “method agnostic”, a new promising method may uncover other methods and theories that totally pull the rug out from under old theories and methods that is a necessary and sometimes brutal aspect to scientific progress.
Economics, because it began and is sustained for the most part as a system of methods searching for justification for their continuation, is largely incapable of undergoing these necessary “method resets” that come periodically in any scientific discipline.
Chemistry can admit that atoms aren’t tiny planets with electons orbiting like moons because Chemistry didn’t start as the pursuit to find evidence for atoms being like solarsystems and flesh out the theory that atoms are like solarsystems.
Thus no matter if locally good science is being done in economics it is undermined by the uncomfortable need to preserve the survival of the foundatinal contextualizing methods and axioms they invoke implicitly from the truth uncovered, a vice that plagues any human endeavor consciously and subconsciously and not only keeps Economics from being a real science it also largely sucks the oxygen out of the room for actually scientifically rigorous study of these phenomena.
Alchemy is a great analog here to compare Economics too. Alchemists in the pursuit of trying to figure out how to turn things to gold did interact with and in some ways advance chemistry, but alchemy could never divest itself from its own pre-existing beliefs and methods as chemistry discovered more and more of the universe and began to accurately predict more and more of it.
If alchemy was capable discarding old methods to pursue understanding phenomena more lucidly and precisely chemistry would probably be called “alchemy” in english nowadays and alchemy would be called “pseudo-alchemy”.
Economics equates to alchemy they express a desire of a system of methods, axioms and explanations to produce a certain end goal and it forms fatal shackles to the follies of the past.
Any time I’ve attempted to argue for alternative economic paradigms (not just alternative economic systems, but actually rethinking the fundamental assumptions and theories by which we study and attempt to understand economic systems and phenomena), lazy thinkers hit me with the “nuh uh, that’s not what [classical economic theory] says! You don’t know what you’re talking about.”
It’s a thoughtless appeal to authority lacking any substance. The word for that is “dogma.”
I think a major casualty of the war on science funded primarily by fossil fuel interests has been that the kneejerk pro-science response has become a lazy appeal to authority.
People say “99% of scientists all agree listen to them you are not worthy of having an opinion on this!” and while it is arguably true lol, it also sends a message undermining to the interests of science.
Science is the practice of skepticism not of finding facts and crusading under their banner in a materialist campaign of conquest. Facts are rather the inevitable residue of science after science has subjected theories to extended and diverse torturuous inquisition.
I wish people defended science by saying it isn’t a set of Correct Facts but a system of Skepticism that has thoroughly examined a shared body of knowledge and that you should assume that if the more fantastic sounding theories contained within that arena of “skeptical melee” haven’t been dismantled that you can probably trust that they are real, as fantastic as they sound.
This when you shorten it sounds like an appeal to authority where the scientists are given undue authority but it is not the same thing. What matters is the environment of genuine skepticism that scientific theories and “facts” are subjected to in order to establish their validity that matters.
Ugh, yes, when I was in university I had the audacity to attempt to have original thoughts, and everyone was like “Nuh uh, no one has ever said that anywhere in the source material.”
But it’s like “Someone said A, another person said B, and a third person said C. I’m just putting those together in a new way and telling you ABC.” But they’re like “None of the sources say ABC.” So I’m like “Look at the world around you, and you can clearly see that ABC.” And they’re like “that’s just anecdotal, not a peer-reviewed double-blind study.”
I called it academic gatekeeping. I also said it’s gaslighting ourselves into ignoring reality. They didn’t like either of those things. They seemed to think I was some flat earth anti-vaxxer (I’m not).
Modern academia has become downright anti-intellectual and extremely averse to divergent or non-conforming outlooks. It’s kinda sad.
What definition of pseudoscience would capture economics without capturing medicine, ecology, or meteorology?
Everyone’s just using models here, and the way we incorporate statistical observations to define the limits of the models’ scope, and refine the models over time, or reject the models entirely, applies to economists, meteorologists, seismologists, and many branches of actual human medicine.
Popper would define pseudoscience as predictions that can’t be falsified, but surely that can’t apply to the idea of the weatherman predicting rain and being wrong, right?
Kuhn came along and argued that science is about solving problems within paradigms, and sometimes rejecting paradigms in scientific revolutions (geocentrism vs heliocentrism, Newtonian physics versus Einstein’s relativity), but it wasn’t a particularly robust test for separating out pseudoscience.
Lakatos categorized things further at explaining how model-breaking observations could be handled within the structure of how science performs its work (limiting the scope of the model, expanding the complexity of the model to fit the new observations, proposing specific exception handlers), but also observed the difference between the hard core of a discipline, in which attempts at refutation were not tolerated, and auxiliary hypotheses where the scientists were free to test their ideas for falsifiability.
But when you use these ideas to try to understand how science works, I don’t think economics really stands out as less scientific than cancer research or climatology or other statistically driven scientific disciplines.
Namely, the scientific method relies on inductive reasoning and foundational economics relies heavily on deductive reasoning.
The difference isn’t the data itself, it’s what they do with it. Medicine takes subjective, self-reported pain scales and plugs them directly into rigorous, double-blind, randomized controlled trials where they isolate variables to test a strictly falsifiable hypothesis.
Foundational economics, on the other hand, takes subjective concepts like “utility” or “rational self-interest” and uses them as unfalsifiable, deductive assumptions to guess how massive, open systems work.
Basically, you can put a new painkiller in a placebo-controlled trial to scientifically prove if it reduces that subjective pain, but you can’t put a macroeconomy in a petri dish to run a controlled, repeatable experiment on supply and demand.
Plenty of medical science doesn’t lend itself well to double blind studies. In vivo infection models can’t ethically be tested with double blind studies, and can only be observed. Lots of medicine advances through observational studies, too, like almost anything relating to nutrition or lifestyle or trauma. There’s no double blind study on how survivable car accidents are.
Plus double blind studies themselves don’t necessarily have any kind of explanatory power (see the entire field of anesthesia where we know how much of each anesthetic it generally takes to put people under, but we don’t know the underlying mechanism it uses to make people go under). Or, for that matter, Tylenol (whose mechanism of action remains a mystery).
That’s just it, though. Outliers are treated fundamentally differently between them, they are treated as bugs in economics, but as features in medicine.
If a “universal” drug fails for a specific group, medicine views that outlier as a falsification that proves the rule is incomplete. They use the exception to fix the theory.
Foundational economics does the opposite: it treats axioms like “rational actors” as holy scripture, so when people don’t behave like the math says they should, the economists just dismiss them as “irrational” and keep the model exactly the same.
Even if we don’t know the mechanism behind Tylenol, we can still falsify whether or not it works. You can’t falsify a “rational actor” because the moment someone does something weird, you just move the goalposts. Medicine is trying to map the territory; foundational economics insists the map is right and the territory is just acting up. It’s barely based in reality.
Outliers are treated fundamentally differently between them, they are treated as bugs in economics, but as features in medicine.
I don’t understand what you mean by this.
Let’s take for example a simple example of the outlier of the person who smokes a lot of cigarettes but outlives the person who doesn’t smoke. Does this break the model where smoking harms health and increases all cause mortality (which we know through epidemiological observation of deaths, which is not in any sense a double blind test)? Where does this observation fit into medicine?
Or take the example of a discontinuity regression in economics. A jurisdiction passes a law increasing the minimum wage above the market-clearing wage in that area, which shares a border with another jurisdiction that has a similar market clearing wage. Can we observe the differences on both sides of that border to see whether the minimum wage increase leads to an increase in unemployment? Yes, it’s just applied math at that point.
Where does behavioral economics fit into your ideas of how economics expects a rational actor? There are differences in behavior that have been measured by economists in different situations, and those are important ideas in economic behavior and observations. So why do you assume those models have been discarded in favor of some sort of doctrinal insistence that humans behave in a particular way?
And if you’re describing the reluctance of practitioners to abandon the core ideas of their models, or the core paradigms of their disciplines, I’d observe that you’re largely correct but wrong to assume it doesn’t happen in things that you’d probably call science, from medicine to meteorology to epidemiology. Things get overturned slowly, and sometimes these paradigm shifts meet a lot of resistance for an entire generation: phlogiston proponents slowly coming around on oxygen, cosmologists saying “fine I guess dark energy exists.”
The critiques you lob at economics are valid. I just think you under appreciate how much they apply to hard science, too.
When a weatherman’s prediction is falsified, the model itself is not disproven. The fact that the practitioners of that discipline stick with it even when a prediction is falsified starts to look like the pseudoscience side of Popper’s falsifiability criterion.
I once called economics a pseudoscience in a reddit comment and some libertarian-capitalist type got suuuper butthurt about it.
He said I don’t understand the word pseudoscience. I said, “no I understand it just fine. You don’t understand economics.”
His only response was to call that a “no, you” argument. Dunning-Kruger on full display.
Basic foundational “observations” by Economics aren’t based on the Scientific Method.
I wish the Scientific Method didn’t have “Method” in the name because while it is a sensible name it also is misleading.
Science is “method agnostic”, a new promising method may uncover other methods and theories that totally pull the rug out from under old theories and methods that is a necessary and sometimes brutal aspect to scientific progress.
Economics, because it began and is sustained for the most part as a system of methods searching for justification for their continuation, is largely incapable of undergoing these necessary “method resets” that come periodically in any scientific discipline.
Chemistry can admit that atoms aren’t tiny planets with electons orbiting like moons because Chemistry didn’t start as the pursuit to find evidence for atoms being like solarsystems and flesh out the theory that atoms are like solarsystems.
Thus no matter if locally good science is being done in economics it is undermined by the uncomfortable need to preserve the survival of the foundatinal contextualizing methods and axioms they invoke implicitly from the truth uncovered, a vice that plagues any human endeavor consciously and subconsciously and not only keeps Economics from being a real science it also largely sucks the oxygen out of the room for actually scientifically rigorous study of these phenomena.
Alchemy is a great analog here to compare Economics too. Alchemists in the pursuit of trying to figure out how to turn things to gold did interact with and in some ways advance chemistry, but alchemy could never divest itself from its own pre-existing beliefs and methods as chemistry discovered more and more of the universe and began to accurately predict more and more of it.
If alchemy was capable discarding old methods to pursue understanding phenomena more lucidly and precisely chemistry would probably be called “alchemy” in english nowadays and alchemy would be called “pseudo-alchemy”.
Economics equates to alchemy they express a desire of a system of methods, axioms and explanations to produce a certain end goal and it forms fatal shackles to the follies of the past.
Any time I’ve attempted to argue for alternative economic paradigms (not just alternative economic systems, but actually rethinking the fundamental assumptions and theories by which we study and attempt to understand economic systems and phenomena), lazy thinkers hit me with the “nuh uh, that’s not what [classical economic theory] says! You don’t know what you’re talking about.”
It’s a thoughtless appeal to authority lacking any substance. The word for that is “dogma.”
I think a major casualty of the war on science funded primarily by fossil fuel interests has been that the kneejerk pro-science response has become a lazy appeal to authority.
People say “99% of scientists all agree listen to them you are not worthy of having an opinion on this!” and while it is arguably true lol, it also sends a message undermining to the interests of science.
Science is the practice of skepticism not of finding facts and crusading under their banner in a materialist campaign of conquest. Facts are rather the inevitable residue of science after science has subjected theories to extended and diverse torturuous inquisition.
I wish people defended science by saying it isn’t a set of Correct Facts but a system of Skepticism that has thoroughly examined a shared body of knowledge and that you should assume that if the more fantastic sounding theories contained within that arena of “skeptical melee” haven’t been dismantled that you can probably trust that they are real, as fantastic as they sound.
This when you shorten it sounds like an appeal to authority where the scientists are given undue authority but it is not the same thing. What matters is the environment of genuine skepticism that scientific theories and “facts” are subjected to in order to establish their validity that matters.
Ugh, yes, when I was in university I had the audacity to attempt to have original thoughts, and everyone was like “Nuh uh, no one has ever said that anywhere in the source material.”
But it’s like “Someone said A, another person said B, and a third person said C. I’m just putting those together in a new way and telling you ABC.” But they’re like “None of the sources say ABC.” So I’m like “Look at the world around you, and you can clearly see that ABC.” And they’re like “that’s just anecdotal, not a peer-reviewed double-blind study.”
I called it academic gatekeeping. I also said it’s gaslighting ourselves into ignoring reality. They didn’t like either of those things. They seemed to think I was some flat earth anti-vaxxer (I’m not).
Modern academia has become downright anti-intellectual and extremely averse to divergent or non-conforming outlooks. It’s kinda sad.
I like the term Scientific filter. Theories get endlessly filtered though experimentation untill we get purer and purer truth.
What definition of pseudoscience would capture economics without capturing medicine, ecology, or meteorology?
Everyone’s just using models here, and the way we incorporate statistical observations to define the limits of the models’ scope, and refine the models over time, or reject the models entirely, applies to economists, meteorologists, seismologists, and many branches of actual human medicine.
Popper would define pseudoscience as predictions that can’t be falsified, but surely that can’t apply to the idea of the weatherman predicting rain and being wrong, right?
Kuhn came along and argued that science is about solving problems within paradigms, and sometimes rejecting paradigms in scientific revolutions (geocentrism vs heliocentrism, Newtonian physics versus Einstein’s relativity), but it wasn’t a particularly robust test for separating out pseudoscience.
Lakatos categorized things further at explaining how model-breaking observations could be handled within the structure of how science performs its work (limiting the scope of the model, expanding the complexity of the model to fit the new observations, proposing specific exception handlers), but also observed the difference between the hard core of a discipline, in which attempts at refutation were not tolerated, and auxiliary hypotheses where the scientists were free to test their ideas for falsifiability.
But when you use these ideas to try to understand how science works, I don’t think economics really stands out as less scientific than cancer research or climatology or other statistically driven scientific disciplines.
To quote the order commenter here, basic foundational “observations” by Economics aren’t based on the Scientific Method.
In what way? And how does that differ from how medicine measures pain?
Namely, the scientific method relies on inductive reasoning and foundational economics relies heavily on deductive reasoning.
The difference isn’t the data itself, it’s what they do with it. Medicine takes subjective, self-reported pain scales and plugs them directly into rigorous, double-blind, randomized controlled trials where they isolate variables to test a strictly falsifiable hypothesis.
Foundational economics, on the other hand, takes subjective concepts like “utility” or “rational self-interest” and uses them as unfalsifiable, deductive assumptions to guess how massive, open systems work.
Basically, you can put a new painkiller in a placebo-controlled trial to scientifically prove if it reduces that subjective pain, but you can’t put a macroeconomy in a petri dish to run a controlled, repeatable experiment on supply and demand.
This difference invites a lot of woo.
Plenty of medical science doesn’t lend itself well to double blind studies. In vivo infection models can’t ethically be tested with double blind studies, and can only be observed. Lots of medicine advances through observational studies, too, like almost anything relating to nutrition or lifestyle or trauma. There’s no double blind study on how survivable car accidents are.
Plus double blind studies themselves don’t necessarily have any kind of explanatory power (see the entire field of anesthesia where we know how much of each anesthetic it generally takes to put people under, but we don’t know the underlying mechanism it uses to make people go under). Or, for that matter, Tylenol (whose mechanism of action remains a mystery).
That’s just it, though. Outliers are treated fundamentally differently between them, they are treated as bugs in economics, but as features in medicine.
If a “universal” drug fails for a specific group, medicine views that outlier as a falsification that proves the rule is incomplete. They use the exception to fix the theory.
Foundational economics does the opposite: it treats axioms like “rational actors” as holy scripture, so when people don’t behave like the math says they should, the economists just dismiss them as “irrational” and keep the model exactly the same.
Even if we don’t know the mechanism behind Tylenol, we can still falsify whether or not it works. You can’t falsify a “rational actor” because the moment someone does something weird, you just move the goalposts. Medicine is trying to map the territory; foundational economics insists the map is right and the territory is just acting up. It’s barely based in reality.
I don’t understand what you mean by this.
Let’s take for example a simple example of the outlier of the person who smokes a lot of cigarettes but outlives the person who doesn’t smoke. Does this break the model where smoking harms health and increases all cause mortality (which we know through epidemiological observation of deaths, which is not in any sense a double blind test)? Where does this observation fit into medicine?
Or take the example of a discontinuity regression in economics. A jurisdiction passes a law increasing the minimum wage above the market-clearing wage in that area, which shares a border with another jurisdiction that has a similar market clearing wage. Can we observe the differences on both sides of that border to see whether the minimum wage increase leads to an increase in unemployment? Yes, it’s just applied math at that point.
Where does behavioral economics fit into your ideas of how economics expects a rational actor? There are differences in behavior that have been measured by economists in different situations, and those are important ideas in economic behavior and observations. So why do you assume those models have been discarded in favor of some sort of doctrinal insistence that humans behave in a particular way?
And if you’re describing the reluctance of practitioners to abandon the core ideas of their models, or the core paradigms of their disciplines, I’d observe that you’re largely correct but wrong to assume it doesn’t happen in things that you’d probably call science, from medicine to meteorology to epidemiology. Things get overturned slowly, and sometimes these paradigm shifts meet a lot of resistance for an entire generation: phlogiston proponents slowly coming around on oxygen, cosmologists saying “fine I guess dark energy exists.”
The critiques you lob at economics are valid. I just think you under appreciate how much they apply to hard science, too.
This is why the joke is partially tongue in cheek. ;)
There are several physical autonomic responses that demonstrate feeling pain that can be measured objectively.
It’s not just faces on a numbered chart
A weatherman predicting rain has made a falsifiable prediction, how does that relate to Popper?
When a weatherman’s prediction is falsified, the model itself is not disproven. The fact that the practitioners of that discipline stick with it even when a prediction is falsified starts to look like the pseudoscience side of Popper’s falsifiability criterion.