State actors can and have compelled ISPs to redirect DNS traffic. The most notable case I can remember is Turkey assuming control over Google’s anycast address (8.8.8.8) via BGP hijacking to enforce Twitter bans (that was in 2014).
If we are talking DoT/DoH, then BGP hijacking has a more limited impact as there is encryption involved there, but it still requires IP routing the same as anything else, so modifying BGP routes would be effective if the goal was to break non-compliant DNS providers.
So that’s not actually true with DNS exactly.
State actors can and have compelled ISPs to redirect DNS traffic. The most notable case I can remember is Turkey assuming control over Google’s anycast address (8.8.8.8) via BGP hijacking to enforce Twitter bans (that was in 2014).
If we are talking DoT/DoH, then BGP hijacking has a more limited impact as there is encryption involved there, but it still requires IP routing the same as anything else, so modifying BGP routes would be effective if the goal was to break non-compliant DNS providers.